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Status(es) in the Nordic Countries
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A B S T R A C T
The interpretation and use of subsidiary protection in Europe has received much atten-
tion in recent years. An area that has received considerably less attention is that of the 
residual forms of complementary protection that exist in national legislation but that have 
not been harmonized at a European level.
The key to understanding the contemporary use of complementary protection in 
the Nordic region lies in its origin and development to date. This article will therefore 
explain the conception of and contents of other complementary forms of protection 
and their use today compared to EU harmonized subsidiary protection. The article will 
analyse the  existing legislation and practical examples of its application at first instance, 
on appeal, or by other precedent setting bodies.
1 .  I n T R o d u C T I o n
Prior to the adoption of the EU acquis on asylum, the Nordic countries were consid-
ered to be at the forefront of the use of complementary forms of protection. The Nordic 
countries had had domestic forms of complementary protection for decades, in addi-
tion to refugee status as stipulated by the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1951 Convention). The different types of status were called de facto status or 
humanitarian protection.
When the EU introduced subsidiary protection in Council Directive 2004/83/EC 
of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third coun-
try nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need interna-
tional protection and the content of the protection granted (Qualification Directive), 
the EU member states, Finland, and Sweden transposed the statuses as prescribed 
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while, at the same time, retaining the existing forms of complementary status.1 Norway, 
which is not an EU member state, chose to harmonize its legislation with the EU acquis, 
but also to keep its old forms of protection.
Denmark, although an EU member state, has a special arrangement, whereby it does 
not take part in any measures under Justice and Home Affairs, including asylum and 
migration.2 Consequently, Denmark is not party to any directive on asylum or migra-
tion and is not bound by the interpretations by the European Court of Justice in this 
field. Denmark has therefore not transposed the statuses of the Qualification Directive, 
but has developed its own interpretation of complementary protection based on the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.
In recent years, there has been discussion as to (i) whether the Nordic countries 
should still have additional forms of protection; (ii) regarding the differing interpre-
tations of subsidiary protection and other complementary forms of protection in the 
various countries; and (iii) whether it would be desirable for the EU to continue its 
harmonization by extending it to additional categories of persons in need of protection 
beyond the Qualification Directive.
2 .  T H E  C o n C E P T  o F  n o n - E u  H A R M o n I Z E d 
P R o T E C T I o n   S TAT u S
2.1 What are the harmonized protection statuses within the EU?
Pursuant to their obligations as EU member states under the area of Freedom, Justice, 
and Security, member states are required to harmonize their domestic legislation with 
the acquis in regard to refugee status and subsidiary protection in accordance with the 
EC Recast Qualification Directive, and temporary protection status in accordance with 
Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving tem-
porary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures 
promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons and 
bearing the consequences thereof.
The term ‘harmonization’ in this context means the approximation of domestic 
law by means of Community law standards. This is important to bear in mind because 
‘harmonization’ implies that member states have a certain flexibility in introducing or 
retaining domestic regulations. The standards contained in the directives are minimum 
standards and member states are free to have higher, or more stringent, standards in 
accordance with article 288 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) and special provisions in the directives, for instance, article 3 of the (Recast) 
Qualification Directive. According to Community case-law, if domestic standards are 
introduced, they shall provide more favourable conditions, they shall not ‘undermine 
the coherence of Community action’ and, finally, they shall be in conformity with the 
Treaty.
1 The Qualification Directive was replaced in 2011 by Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011 on the standards for 
the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform 
status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted (the Recast 
Qualification Directive).
2 Protocol on the position of Denmark, adopted by the 1997 Amsterdam treaty OJ 1997, C340.
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One of the main objectives of the Qualification Directive was to codify the status of 
certain groups that had been identified as persons in need of international protection 
in domestic practice, but that, until then, had not been comprehensively regulated in 
international law. They were referred to as de facto refugees, in contradistinction to de 
jure refugees, that is, refugees as defined by the 1951 Convention. The groups that the 
drafters agreed to include in the new concept of subsidiary protection were so-called 
‘war refugees’, fleeing indiscriminate violence and persons falling under the scope of 
article 3 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and article 3 of the 1984 UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).
The legal basis for an obligation to grant status to ‘war refugees’ or people threatened 
by indiscriminate violence can be traced back to the travaux préparatoires of the 1951 
Convention, where this is an area specifically foreseen for the application of the 1951 
Convention, albeit with a nexus to the refugee grounds.3 The atrocities of war were 
considered to be captured within the definition of ‘persecution’.4 Prior to the adoption 
of the Qualification Directive, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
recommended in several resolutions that subsidiary protection should be granted to 
persons fleeing their country of origin because of indiscriminate violence.5
UNHCR’s Executive Committee recommended its member states that complemen-
tary protection outside the scope of the 1951 Convention should be granted when ‘a 
need for international protection arises where such protection is lacking, either as a 
matter of law or as a matter of fact, with the result that basic human rights are seri-
ously at risk. Such a situation typically comes about in relation to persecution, threats 
to life and personal security, armed conflict, serious public disorder or other man-made 
disasters’.6
The recognition of the protection needs of persons displaced because of armed con-
flict has progressively become integrated into international law through the adoption 
of the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems 
in Africa and the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, and by the extension 
of UNHCR’s competence ratione personae by the UN General Assembly and the 
Economic and Social Committee to cover situations of forced displacement resulting 
from conflict, indiscriminate violence, and public disorder.7 However, since the 1980s, 
3 T Einarsen, ‘Drafting history of the 1951 Convention and the1967 Protocol’ in A Zimmermann (ed), The 1951 Convention 
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol: A Commentary (OUP 2011) 67.
4 This was also explained in UNHCR’s Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status of 1992, paras 
164–66. cf, V Holzer, ‘The 1951 Refugee Convention and the Protection of People Fleeing Armed Conflict and Other 
Situations of Violence’ (UNHCR, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Sept 2012); S Juss, ‘Problematizing the 
Protection of “War Refugees”: A Rejoinder to Hugo Story and Jean-Francois Durieux’ (2013) 32 RSQ 22–124.
5 cf Council of Europe, Recommendation 18 (2001) of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Subsidiary 
Protection, 27 Nov 2001.
6 UNHCR, ‘Providing International Protection Including Through Complementary Forms of Protection’: EC/55/SC/
CRP.16 (2 June 2005) para 2. See also UNHCR, ‘Complementary Forms of Protection: Their Nature and Relationship to 
the International Refugee Protection Regime’: EC/50/SC/C (9 June 2000). See also, the comprehensive study on comple-
mentary protection, R Mandal, ‘Protection Mechanisms Outside of the 1951 Convention (“Complementary Protection”)’ 
(UNHCR, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, PPLA/2005/02, June 2005).
7 UNHCR, ‘Statement on Subsidiary Protection Under the EC Qualification Directive for People Threatened by 
Indiscriminate Violence’ ( Jan 2008) 1–2.
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it has been the group that has most frequently received complementary protection in 
the industrialized world.8 The protection accorded this category was primarily a form 
of humanitarian status for persons in a ‘refugee-like situation’, giving them protection 
from refoulement but not a right to admission on protection grounds per se.9
2.2 Non-EU harmonized protection status
The European Migration Network (EMN), which was established by the European 
Council to provide information on migration and asylum to support policy-making 
in the EU, conducted a study, in 2010, in twenty-three European countries to compare 
practices in regard to the use of non-EU harmonized protection status.10 EMN con-
cluded that EU member states primarily use three categories of complementary protec-
tion, apart from the ones stipulated by the acquis.
The first is protection status(es) consistent with the Convention refugee definition 
and the EU acquis, for instance, national temporary protection statuses, exceptional 
residence permits on the basis of an international agreement, protection statuses on 
humanitarian grounds, and residence permits on humanitarian grounds for third-coun-
try nationals who can prove that there is a risk to their safety if they return to their 
country of origin to obtain a visa. The second category includes additional protection 
statuses, based on the principle of non-refoulement or on technical or practical constraints 
to return, for example, statuses on medical grounds, for family reasons, for unaccompa-
nied children, stateless persons, and for tolerated stay/suspension of removal. The final 
category identified by EMN is other stays or permits to stay, for instance, for victims of 
trafficking, witnesses in criminal proceedings, victims of environmental disasters, and 
so forth. This article will only focus on persons in a ‘refugee-like’ situation.
3 .  C o M P L E M E n TA R Y  F o R M S  o F  P R o T E C T I o n  I n  T H E  n o R d I C 
C o u n T R I E S
3.1 Denmark
3.1.1 De facto status and B-status 
Denmark has not transposed the EU directives into its national legislation. It is how-
ever noteworthy that Denmark was one of the countries that provided inspiration for 
the contents of subsidiary protection when the Danish delegation, in 1997, proposed 
8 J Cels, ‘European Responses to De Facto Refugees’ in G Loscher, and L Mohahan (eds), Refugees and International Relations 
(Clarendon Press 1990) 188, 200.
9 It is also worth mentioning that temporary protection has been used throughout history as a means of ensuring the protec-
tion against refoulement in exceptional situations of mass influx due to generalized violence or internal armed conflict. Within 
the EU, it is regulated in Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on Minimum Standards for Giving Temporary 
Protection in the Event of a Mass Influx of Displaced Persons and on Measures Promoting a Balance of Efforts Between 
Member States in Receiving Such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof. In the international protection regime, 
temporary protection developed as a tool for burden-sharing in a situation of mass influx and not as a protection status. This 
fact notwithstanding, EU member states transposing the EC Temporary Protection Directive have sometimes treated it as 
a separate protection status in their national legislation and certain countries use it as a complementary form of protection, 
which has created some confusion as to its meaning.
10 European Migration Network, ‘The Different National Practices Concerning Granting of Non-EU Harmonized Protection 
Status’ (Dec 2010) 4–7.
176 • Subsidiary Protection and Non-EU Harmonized Protection Status(es)
article 3 of the ECHR as an alternative legal basis for protection in the Qualification 
Directive.11 Denmark had used the concept of de facto refugees in its own administra-
tive practice since the 1960s and it was formally included in the Aliens’ Act in 1983. 
According to the old wording of section 7(2) of the Danish Aliens’ Act prior to 2003, 
an alien who did not qualify for refugee status could be granted a residency permit 
if, because of similar grounds (lignende grunde) to those of the Convention, or other 
weighty grounds (tungtvejende grunde), that would result in a well-founded fear of per-
secution or equivalent harm, it could not be required that the applicant returned to 
his country of origin. This provision was interpreted as giving a real (de facto) right to 
a residency permit for persons who risked being subjected to concrete and individual 
persecution of a certain intensity.12
The concept of ‘similar grounds’ was interpreted as implying that the grounds were 
those of the Convention, but the claim did not reach the standard of proof required for 
refugee status, or, even though a risk of human rights violations could be established, 
it did not meet the persecution standard required by the Convention.13 ‘Other serious 
grounds’ was interpreted as meaning ‘on grounds not derived from the Convention as 
it was interpreted in Danish practice’. This included draft evaders from countries at war, 
persons facing punishment because of unauthorized or prolonged stay outside their 
country of origin, ‘republic refugees’ from Eastern Europe risking persecution because 
they had sought asylum in the West, or persons at risk of persecution because of their 
sexual orientation or gender-related persecution. As pointed out by Vedsted-Hansen, in 
most countries, several of these categories are covered by an inclusive interpretation of 
the refugee ground, ‘a particular social group’.14 He explains the rationale for the restric-
tive interpretation of the Convention grounds and the generous application of de facto 
status as borne out of the Danish legal tradition of pragmatism.
The fact that there was an internal armed conflict in the country of origin or gener-
ally difficult circumstances in terms of social conditions, lack of education opportuni-
ties or insufficient health services, was not considered sufficient to warrant protection 
under this provision. Despite this, the Refugee Appeal Board exceptionally decided to 
apply it to all Somali asylum seekers in 1992.15 The reason given was that it could not 
be established who was in control of the territory in Somalia and the general situation 
was so uncertain that it could not be required that the applicants returned. In this case, 
an individual determination of the protection needs was not considered to be required, 
but the determination was made with reference to the general situation in the coun-
try. The provision in section 7(2) was also considered applicable to categories other 
than those covered by the Convention, where Denmark had international obligations 
according to various treaties to refrain from returning a person.
11 Note from the Danish Delegation to Migration and Asylum Working Parties on ‘Subsidiary Protection’, 6764/97, ASIM 52, 
17 Mar 1997.
12 Flygtningenaevnet, Formandskapet, 12 beretning, Copenhagen, 2004, 57–58. N Lassen, ‘Comparative Legal Study on 
Subsidiary Protection’ in D Bouteillet-Paquet (ed), Subsidiary Protection of Refugees in the European Union: Complementing 
the Refugee Convention (Bruylant 2002) 366.
13 J Vedsted-Hansen, ‘The Legal Condition of Refugees in Denmark, Symposium on the Human Rights of Refugees’ (1994) 7 
JRS 253–54; Lassen, ibid, 370.
14 Vedsted-Hansen, ibid 254.
15 K Kjaer, ‘The Abolition of the Danish de facto Concept’ (2003) 15 IJRL 254–75, 265.
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In 2003, the Danish de facto concept was abolished, in accordance with Law 365 
of 6 June 2002 on changes to the Aliens’ Act, and replaced with protection status, or 
B-status (beskyttelsesstatus). The explanatory commentary on the Law indicates that 
the purpose of the changes was to restrict the number of persons obtaining protection 
and to limit its scope to the minimum required according to the international conven-
tions ratified by Denmark.16 The current wording of section 7(2) stipulates that a per-
son can be granted protection status if ‘the alien upon return to his country of origin 
risks death penalty or being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.
3.1.2 Scope of B-status 
Section 7(2) of the Danish Aliens’ Act is primarily based on the prohibition of tor-
ture in article 3 of the ECHR and article 1 of Additional Protocol 6.17 Moreover, the 
Danish B-status is similar to the qualification of subsidiary protection in article 15(a) 
of the Qualification Directive, apart from the fact that there is no mention of execu-
tion, only of the death penalty. Furthermore, there are no references to the categories 
covered by 15(c) at all and, although the categories included in 15(b) are referred to, 
the assessment of the element of risk and the standard of proof differ from that of the 
Qualification Directive.
B-status is intended to be complementary to refugee status in that it is appli-
cable to similar situations. The second instance body, the Refugee Appeals Board 
(Flygtningenaevnet), exemplifies its current practice in regard to what constitutes harm 
in the application of section 7(2).18 The first category is for cases of disproportionate 
punishment amounting to inhuman or degrading punishment, for instance, an Iranian 
Kurd who had been arrested and tortured for having smuggled weapons and who faced 
punishment for having failed his reporting duty.19 Another use of B-status is when there 
are threats of harm by non-state actors but no causal link to the Convention grounds, for 
example, Afghans fearing retaliation from the Taliban, and a Ugandan applicant whose 
injuries were proved to have resulted from torture allegedly from non-state actors.20 
Both of these categories are well covered by the case-law of the European Court of 
Human Rights and they are clearly complementary to refugee status.
Some categories are however accorded B-status despite the fact that the claims 
could have been considered under the refugee definition, most notably, imputed politi-
cal opinion. In several cases that received B-status imputed political opinion could 
arguably have been used as grounds for refugee status instead, for example, an Afghan 
man who was suspected of having spied for the Taliban; an Iranian applicant who had 
refused to co-operate with national intelligence services; a Chechen who feared perse-
cution from the authorities because he had assisted a rebel; and a Somali applicant who 
16 Ministry for Refugees, Immigration and Integration, Hvidbog vedrorende lov nr 365 af 6 juni 2002 om aendring af udlaendin-
geloven og aegteskabsloven med flere love ( Jan 2003). For an exhaustive account of the legislative process, see K Kjaer, ibid, 
254–55.
17 Additional Protocol 13 did not enter into force until the following year.
18 Eg, Flygtningenaevnet, Formandskabet, 19. beretning 2010, Copenhagen 2011; Flygtningenaevnet, Formandskabet, 20. beretning 
2011, Copenhagen 2012.
19 Iran/2010/13.
20 Afg//2011/4, Uganda/2011/1,
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feared his life was in danger from Islamic groups because he had provided transport for 
Government members in his minibus.21
According to contemporary interpretations of political opinion in the refugee definition, it 
is not required that a person in fact hold any political opinion, but it is sufficient that he is per-
ceived by the persecutor as holding such an opinion in order to meet the threshold risk of per-
secution. It is the perspective of the persecutor that should be determinative in this respect.22 
This principle is also confirmed in article 10(2) of the (Recast) Qualification Directive.
Another type of case that receives B-status instead of Convention refugee status is 
when applicants have a relative who has been persecuted for Convention, or non-Con-
vention, reasons. In one illustrative example, a Sri Lankan woman had been interro-
gated and raped by the military because of her husband’s activities.23 In cases where the 
persecution of a relative have a causal link to Convention reasons, refugee status could 
also have been granted to the applicant on imputed political or religious reasons. The 
evidence value of past persecution of relatives is that it can substantiate the wellfound-
edness of the applicant’s claim for refugee status.24
B-status was considered for persons claiming to be draft evaders and deserters in a 
number of cases. In these cases, the Refugee Appeals Board made an assessment of the 
proportionality of the punishment for having deserted, with a rather high threshold: 
‘the fact that the applicant risk a prison sentence because of his desertion, does not give 
grounds to grant asylum’, but in the case of draft evaders, ‘the fact that the applicant risk 
punishment because of draft evasion is sufficient to grant asylum’.25 One applicant risk-
ing the death sentence for draft evasion was granted B status in 2010.26
The Refugee Appeals Board’s practice here is in line with the explicit reference to 
protection from the death penalty in article 7(2). UNHCR’s Handbook concurs that 
disproportionate punishment can be grounds for refugee status, while disproportion-
ate punishment without nexus to the grounds may fall under inhuman or degrading 
punishment.27 By using B-status in cases of inhuman and degrading treatment cases, 
Denmark expands the scope of protection beyond that of refugee status, albeit within 
the realms of the protection of article 3 ECHR.
The Refugee Appeals Board has been very clear that the assessment of claims based 
on generalized violence lies outside its scope of work: ‘The competence of the Board is 
… limited to assessing questions relevant to asylum, that is, individual risk of persecu-
tion or harm, and it is therefore outside the competence of the Board to assess whether, 
an alien who does not fulfil the criteria in section 7 of the Aliens’ Act, can be accorded 
a residency permit for other and more humanitarian reasons, for instance, because 
of temporary, generalized violence where the applicant does not fulfil the criteria of 
Article 7’.28 The Refugee Appeals Board continues that ‘an undoubtedly difficult – but 
21 Rus/2010/5, Afg/2011/65, Iran/2011/19, Som/2010/7.
22 UNHCR, ‘Interpreting Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees’ (Apr 2001) para 2.
23 Sri/2011/4.
24 UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (1992), para 43.
25 Nigeria/2010/3, Syria/2010/32.
26 Armenia/2010/4.
27 UNHCR, Handbook, above n 24, paras 167–74.
28 Flygtningenaevnet, Formandskabet, 20, above n 18, 66.
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general – security situation in a country cannot by itself constitute grounds for asylum 
according to Article 7 of the Aliens’ Act’.29
3.1.3 Criteria for the risk assessment 
The Refugee Appeals Board explained the applicability of section 7 as: ‘It is a condition 
for residency permit according to section 7 that, following an individual and concrete 
assessment, an alien is considered at risk of persecution or other harm (overgreb) that is 
the basis for asylum’.30 Initially, a common criterion for risk assessment was established 
for both Convention and de facto status, namely, fear of concrete, individual, persecu-
tion of a certain intensity or a risk of (such persecution). It has been interpreted in 
practice as there having to be specifically qualifying circumstances directed against one 
particular individual, and the risk of harm has to be sufficiently concrete.31 It seems as if 
this is often interpreted as evidence of past persecution.
It should be noted that, in international refugee law, past persecution is not a pre-
requisite for recognition of future persecution, but it can be part of the facts that are 
assessed to determine future risk and used in the part of the assessment pertaining to 
the objective element. UNHCR’s Handbook stipulates that ‘it may be assumed that 
a person has a well-founded fear of persecution if he has already been the victim of 
persecution for one of the reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention’.32 Past persecu-
tion therefore indicates a presumption that there will be continued persecution in the 
future. Article 4(4) of the (Recast) Qualification Directive goes further in providing 
that past persecution, serious harm or direct threats shall be considered as a serious 
indication of the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering 
serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious 
harm will not be repeated. This is considered to lessen the requirement for the applicant 
to substantiate his or her claim of future risk and to instead shift the burden of proof to 
the authority to dispel the claim of future harm.
Based on an analysis of its practice, it seems that the Refugees Appeal Board applies 
a mixture of standards of proof in its assessment of B-status. In some cases, it utilizes a 
‘real risk’, in the same sense as the ECHR in cases of inhuman or degrading treatment, 
but sometimes both refugee status and the risk of inhuman or degrading treatment are 
assessed in terms of ‘concrete and individual’ risk. The distinction between the two is 
somewhat unclear. According to Vedsted-Hansen:
the use of the criteria ‘concrete and individual’ and the later versions of ‘concrete 
special risk’ and ‘concrete, real risk’ … has not only created doubt as to the adher-
ence to convention of an essential element in Danish asylum practice. The crite-
ria and their use have at the same time contributed to a state of law, which seems 
to have created a considerable crisis of legitimacy for the Danish asylum system, 
also by European standards.33
29 ibid 100.
30 ibid 97.
31 J Vedsted-Hansen, ‘“Konkret og individuelt”: Et kriteriums forvandling fra kvalifikation til eksklusion’ in A Møller-Sørensen and 
A Storgaard (eds), Jurist uden omsvøb: Festskrift til Gorm Toftegaard Nielsen (Christian Ejlers 2007) 601.
32 Handbook, above n 24, para 45.
33 Vedsted-Hansen, above n 31, 614–16.
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3.1.4 Caveats 
There are two apparent deficits in the current application of B-status. One pertains to 
the fact that article 15(c) of the (Recast) Qualification Directive is not considered to be 
covered by the provision, which means that one important category of persons in need 
of protection completely falls outside the Danish protection regime, namely persons 
fleeing armed conflict. Vedsted-Hansen has proposed that the initial interpretations of 
the Refugee Appeals Board on the non-applicability of the provision to ‘difficult cir-
cumstances’ referred to when there is ‘a situation similar to an armed conflict’ and not 
when there actually is an internal armed conflict. He claims that subsequent practice 
expanded this interpretation to also exclude ‘real’ internal armed conflicts.34 In his opin-
ion, persecution and harm that happen to occur during a situation of armed conflict 
should still warrant asylum.
It is possible to use the torture provision to encompass persons fleeing armed con-
flict, in line with recent practice by the European Court of Human Rights. In older case-
law, such as NA v the UK and FH v Sweden, the Court had stated that
it had never excluded the possibility that a general situation of violence in a 
country of destination will be of sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any 
removal to it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention. Nevertheless, 
the Court would adopt such an approach only in the most extreme cases of gen-
eral violence, where there was a real risk of ill-treatment simply by virtue of an 
individual being exposed to such violence on return.35
However, in 2011, the European Court of Human Rights pronounced in a case regard-
ing two Somali applicants that return from the UK to Mogadishu would constitute a 
violation of article 3 of the ECHR because, ‘the generalized violence in Mogadishu 
has reached a level where everyone may be at a real risk of harm in accordance with 
the Convention’.36 The Danish Appeal Board noted the decision by the Court and pro-
nounced that, ‘the Board has not at any time excluded the possibility that the general 
security situation in a country may assume such a serious and extreme character that 
the applicant fulfils the criteria for residency permit solely on this ground’ and decided 
to suspend the cases until the judgment was final.37 However, practice from 2012–13 
shows that claims from Somali applicants based on the general situation were rejected.38 
In 2013, the Danish Appeal Board acknowledged the deteriorating situation in Syria 
and the fact that persons originating from areas in Syria where there is armed conflict 
or attacks against civilians would be subjected to a real risk in accordance with article 3.  
34 ibid 603.
35 HLR v France 11/1996/630/813 (Council of Europe: ECtHR, 22 Apr 1997) para 40; NA v The United Kingdom App No 
25904/07 (Council of Europe: ECtHR, 17 July 2008)  para 115; FH v Sweden App no 32621/06 (Council of Europe: 
ECtHR, 20 Jan 2009) 90.
36 Sufi and Elmi v the United Kingdom App nos 8319/07 and 11449/07 (ECtHR 28 June 2011).
37 Flygtningenaevnet, Formandskabet, 20, above n 18, 49.
38 <http://www.flygtningenaevnet.dk/Templates/PraksisSoegeside.aspx?NRMODE=Published&NRNODEGUID=%7b70
F54DDC-B66D-408B-AC3B-C96FD9767C36%7d&NRORIGINALURL=%2fdadk%2f Praksis&NRCACHEHINT=N
oModifyGuest>.
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It emphasized however that not all areas of the country were affected by the conflict and 
that an individual assessment is still required.39
However, it should also be noted that subsequent case-law from the European Court 
of Human Rights relaxes the burden of proof and kind of proof required for a ‘real risk’ of 
ill-treatment. In, for example, MSS v Belgium and Greece, the Court clearly pronounced 
that, ‘The fact that a large number of asylum seekers in Greece find themselves in the 
same situation as the applicant does not make the risk concerned any less individual 
where it is sufficiently real and probable’.40 Moreover, in Hirsi v Italy, the Court made a 
prima facie assessment of the situation in Somalia and Eritrea based on the country of 
origin information without finding it necessary to assess an individualized real risk.41
Secondly, categories that would have been covered by a broad and inclusive interpre-
tation of Convention refugee status were dropped when de facto status was abolished 
never to be picked up again. The concept of ‘a particular social group’ is, for instance, de 
lege lata by virtue of being explicitly included in the article of the Convention contain-
ing the refugee definition, against which it is not possible to have reservations. In regard 
to the interpretation of the concepts of the Convention, for example, imputed political 
opinion and gender-related persecution, the Convention is considered to be a ‘living 
instrument’, which, as explained by Goodwin-Gill, ‘should be interpreted in light of 
present-day conditions and in accordance with developments in international law’.42
3.2 Finland
3.2.1 Humanitarian protection 
Chapter VI of the Finnish Aliens’ Act (301/2004) contains the criteria for grant-
ing international protection. Section 31 of the 1991 Finnish Aliens’ Act (378/1991) 
already contained a provision for protection for persons who would be threatened by 
capital punishment, torture, or other inhuman or degrading treatment, or because of 
armed conflict or environmental catastrophe upon return. A similar provision could 
be found in section 9(4) of the Finnish Constitution, also linking the principle of non-
refoulement with the danger of the death sentence, torture, or other treatment violating 
human dignity in case of return.
In 1999, the Aliens’ Act was amended to provide residence permits to persons in 
need of protection or if it would be ‘obviously unreasonable’ to deny a residence per-
mit. This latter category referred to capital punishment, torture or inhumane treatment, 
armed conflict, and environmental catastrophe. Such an assessment was not based on 
the need for international protection, but the personal circumstances of the applicant 
and had therefore a wider scope ratione personae.43
In 2003, the Act was again amended to clarify, in section 88, the ‘need of protection’ 
for aliens who ‘are in their home country or country of permanent residence under the 
39 <http://www.flygtningenaevnet.dk/da-dk/Nyheder/Nyhedsarkiv/2013/Flygtningenævnet+ændrer+praksis+som+følge
+af+den+forværrede+situation+i+Syrien.htm>.
40 MSS v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 Jan 2011) para 359. Similarily, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App 
no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 Feb 2012) para 136.
41 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (ECtHR, 23 Feb 2012).
42 GS Goodwin-Gill, ‘The Search for One True Meaning’ in GS Goodwin-Gill and H Lambert (eds), The Limits of Transnational 
Law. Refugee Law, Policy Harmonization and Judicial Dialogue in the European Union (CUP 2010) 207.
43 E Nykänen, ‘Comparative Legal Study on Subsidiary Protection - Finland’ in Bouteillet-Paquet (ed), above n 12, 404.
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threat of the death penalty, torture or other inhuman treatment or treatment violating 
human dignity, or if they cannot return there because of an armed conflict or environ-
mental disaster’.
In order to ensure transposition of the Qualification Directive and harmonize the 
protection grounds with other EU member states, the existing law and practice were 
assessed in 2007 and proposals were made for changes to the Aliens’ Act, which were 
enacted in 2009. The category of persons in ‘need of protection’ was removed and 
replaced with the narrower concept of ‘subsidiary protection’. The text of section 88 
was amended to correspond to article 2(e) and article 15(a)-(c) of the Qualification 
Directive, save the phrase ‘violating human dignity’, which is derived from the Finnish 
Constitution and was considered to equate to the notion of ‘degrading treatment’ in 
the Directive.44
According to section 88(1)(3) of the Act, subsidiary protection will be granted to a 
person for whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the person, if 
returned to his or her country of origin or country of former habitual residence, would 
face a real risk of being subjected to serious harm, and he or she is unable, or owing to 
such risk, unwilling to avail him or herself of the protection of that country. Serious 
harm is found to mean the death penalty or execution, torture or other inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment, or serious and individual threat as a result of indis-
criminate violence in situations of internal or international conflict.
However, with a reference to article 3 of the Qualification Directive allowing for 
more favourable provisions, a third protection ground, so-called ‘humanitarian pro-
tection’, was introduced. Humanitarian protection was proposed to contain the forms 
of protection that previously had been covered by persons in ‘need of protection’ but 
that could not be incorporated in ‘subsidiary protection’. According to section 88a(1), 
‘humanitarian protection’ can be granted to a person who cannot return to his or her 
country of origin or country of former habitual residence ‘as a result of an environ-
mental catastrophe or a bad security situation which may be due to an international or 
internal armed conflict or a poor human rights situation’.45 Two categories have thereby 
been moved from the provision on subsidiary protection: victims of an environmental 
disaster and persons fleeing an armed conflict of lesser intensity than the one encom-
passed by subsidiary protection. The provision is tertiary in the sense that the applicant 
shall first be assessed for asylum and subsidiary protection and only if neither of theses 
statuses is applicable will humanitarian protection be considered.
Following an increase in the number of asylum applicants during 2007–8, the 
Government announced a set of thirteen restrictive measures on 3 September 2008, 
which were proposed ‘to reduce the number of arrivals of persons not in need of 
international protection’. One of the measures related to the application of humanitar-
ian protection, where the Government proposed that each case should be examined 
individually, and not undergo a general group assessment based on the particular 
geographical area.
44 Finnish Government Bill 166/2007 rd, for an act amending the Aliens’ Act, Regeringens proposition till Riksdagen med förslag 
till lagar om ändring av utlänningslagen och av vissa lagar som har samband med den (2007) 29.
45 Law 323/2009.
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As a consequence, the Immigration Regulation was amended in 2009 to stipulate 
that the individual situation of each applicant should be assessed when applying section 
38 of the Act. The decisive factors are not the applicant’s nationality or the geographi-
cal region from which he/she originates, but the individual applicant’s possibilities of 
returning to his/her country of origin. The Ministry may instruct the Directorate of 
Immigration to make exemptions in certain cases, see section 76, paragraph 3, of the 
Act.
3.2.2 Scope of humanitarian protection 
According to the Administrative Committee of the Finnish Parliament, which com-
mented on the proposal to change the Aliens’ Act, section 88a would be applicable 
to persons who cannot return because of indiscriminate violence, which is not indi-
vidualized.46 According to the Committee, the asylum authorities should first assess 
the protection needs in accordance with sections 87 and 88 and thereafter assess what 
consequences the general situation in the country of origin may have on the applicant 
in case of return in accordance with section 88a. The second assessment is therefore not 
of eligibility, but of returnability.
Humanitarian protection can be granted if the situation in the country, objectively 
speaking, could result in real and serious danger because of the armed conflict for an 
individual in case of return. There should be a causal link between the armed conflict and 
the poor security situation. According to Government Bill 166/2007, the main differ-
ence between the two provisions on armed conflict in section 88 and section 88a is that, 
in the case of the latter, an assessment is made on the effects of the armed conflict on the 
civilian population as a whole. The Administrative Committee gives, as an example, the 
person residing in a place threatened by generalized violence without any internal flight 
possibilities within the country.47 If the battles take place in another part of the country, 
where the applicant is not residing, it is not considered as ‘real and serious danger’.
According to the Administrative Committee, the definition of armed conflict 
includes armed conflicts regulated by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and its Additional 
Protocols, but also other types of armed violence and armed disturbances. The assess-
ment should take into account the nature of the violence, its geographical location, its 
intensity, and to what extent there are violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 
The Committee also concluded that the assessment should consider the authorities’ 
ability to monitor territories within its control and to guarantee its citizens’ safety, and 
to what extent the judicial system can ensure the fundamental rights of citizens.
The Committee proposed however that the provision should not only be applicable 
to situations of armed conflict, but also to cases of massive human rights violations 
that have a detrimental impact on the security situation. However, it emphasized that, 
in order for this part of the provision to be applicable, it is not sufficient only to have 
documented violations of human rights in a particular country, there should addition-
ally be a link to a grave security situation. The Committee added that this confirmed 
existing practice.
46 Report of the Administrative Committee on the Government Proposal for an act amending the Aliens’ Act, 
Förvaltningsutskottets betänkande 26/2008 rd, Regeringens proposition med förslag till lagar om ändring av utlänningslagen och av 
vissa lagar som har samband med den (2008), HaVM 26/2008, 6.
47 ibid.
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The provision on environmental catastrophe was intended to be used in situations 
where a man-made disaster has occurred in the country of origin or country of resi-
dence, leading to an inhabitable or dangerous environment.48 When the Aliens’ Act was 
revised in 2003, it was considered whether to remove the provision on environmental 
disasters as a ground for protection. The reason for this proposal was partly because it 
was considered that the first option, when there is a natural disaster, is to seek protec-
tion in one’s own country, not necessarily crossing international borders, and, secondly, 
because the international community normally assists in such situations in order to 
prevent an outflux. There would therefore not be the need for a specific ground for 
persons reaching Finland.
It was also put forward that it would be more appropriate to grant temporary pro-
tection in a situation of a natural disaster, since the need for protection should be of a 
temporary duration. However, it was eventually decided to retain the provision, with 
the clarification that it was intended to be used in situations where a man-made disaster 
has occurred in the country of origin or country of residence, which has led to an inhab-
itable or dangerous environment.49 The provision on environmental catastrophe has as 
yet not been applied in practice.
3.2.3 Criteria for risk assessment 
In a study of the application of subsidiary protection and humanitarian protection 
in 170 sample decisions taken by the Migration Board in 2010, the practice concern-
ing the general assessment of the country of origin information and the intensity of 
the risks was found to be assessed consistently, while the use of criteria for the indi-
vidual risk assessment was less consistent.50 Moreover, the study concluded that, 
the factors that were taken into consideration in order to assess the general situa-
tion included the intensity of violence, geographic location, duration and forms of 
violence, the identity of the victims, type of weaponry used, identity of the parties 
to the conflict, degree of control over the territory by the Government, the over-
all humanitarian situation and the number of killed and displaced civilians. In gen-
eral, these are the criteria that have been identified as the predominant ones in the 
European context.51 However, there were deficits in the application on individual 
cases.
3.2.4 Caveats 
When the legislation was changed and the number of statuses increased, it was with 
the explicit intention that international protection should be granted more frequently.52 
In the travaux préparatoires to the Act, both the Government and the Administrative 
Committee emphasized that the distinction between subsidiary protection and 
humanitarian protection in a situation of armed conflict is that in the former there is a 
48 Government proposal 50/1998.
49 Governmental Bill 28/2003 rd on changes to the Aliens’ Act 83.
50 E Nykänen, ‘On the Lines of Demarcation and Their Significance. The Categories of Complementary Protection under the 
Finnish Aliens’ Act’, paper presented at the Nordic Asylum Seminar, Copenhagen, May 2011.
51 UNHCR, ‘“Safe at Last?” Law and Practice in Selected EU Member States with Respect to Asylum-Seekers Fleeing 
Indiscriminate Violence’ ( July 2011) 42.
52 Above n 44, 50.
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requirement of serious and individual threat as a result of indiscriminate violence, while 
for humanitarian protection there is no requirement of individualization of the risk.
The interpretation of subsidiary protection as prescribed by the Qualification 
Directive in Finland, as in many other European countries at this time, was based on 
discussions in the European Commission’s Contact Group. However, the interpretation 
of article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive by the European Court of Justice in the 
Elgafaji judgment put matters in a different perspective.53 According to the European 
Court of Justice ‘individual’ in the sense of the provision should be interpreted to cover 
harm to:
civilians irrespective of their identity, where the degree of indiscriminate violence 
characterizing armed conflict taking place … reaches such a high level that sub-
stantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian returned to the relevant 
country or, as the case may be, to the relevant region, would solely on account 
of his presence on the territory of that country or region, face a real risk of being 
subject o the serious threat referred to in Article 15(c) of the Directive.54
According to the Court, though, the threshold is so high that it is only reached under 
very exceptional circumstances.55 Moreover, the Court explains that the individualiza-
tion of risk should be assessed according to a sliding scale in that ‘the more the appli-
cant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his 
personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him 
to be eligible for subsidiary protection’.56
Nykänen found in her study some uncertainty in practice, both in regard to the inter-
pretation of subsidiary protection in line with article 15(c), as interpreted in Elgafaji, 
and in distinguishing between subsidiary protection and humanitarian protection. The 
question of what effect Elgafaji will have on the interpretation of subsidiary protec-
tion in Finland and the distinction between subsidiary protection and humanitarian 
protection was however partially covered by a precedent-setting ruling by the Finnish 
Supreme Administrative Court in 2010.57
The Supreme Administrative Court concluded that when examining the need for 
subsidiary protection both collective and individual facts must be taken into consid-
eration, that it, an assessment should be made of both the general situation and the 
individual circumstances for the applicant. In the case at hand, that of a Sunni Muslim 
man from Baghdad, it was established that the applicant had not suffered personally 
from the effects of indiscriminate violence. However, the Court took into account the 
experiences of the applicant’s acquaintances, as well as the general security situation 
in Baghdad presented in the country of origin information, in particular in regard to 
the nature of the violence and the long duration of the conflict, and concluded that 
he should be granted subsidiary protection. Since subsidiary protection was granted, 
53 Elgafaji v Statssecretaris van Justitie C-465/07 (17 Feb 2009). Also, cf J McAdam, Complementary Protection in International 
Refugee Law (OUP 2007) 70–78.
54 ibid para 35.
55 ibid paras 37–38.
56 ibid para 39.
57 Supreme Administrative Court, KHO 2010:84, 30 Dec 2010.
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there was no need for the Court to assess the possible application of the tertiary status, 
humanitarian protection.
By removing the element of personalized threat when applying subsidiary protec-
tion, it puts into question the need for also having the status of humanitarian protection 
in situations of armed conflict. Humanitarian protection can however still be foreseen 
to have a clear added value is the second part of the definition, that is, ‘a bad security 
situation, which may be due to … a poor human rights situation’.
3.3 Norway
3.3.1 Humanitarian protection 
A complementary form of protection, humanitarian protection, was introduced in sec-
tion 15 of the Norwegian Aliens’ Act of 1988, which was a provision on prohibition 
of refoulement, not a provision on eligibility. Section 15, second sentence, stipulated 
that: ‘Corresponding protection shall apply to foreign nationals who for reasons simi-
lar to those given in the definition of a refugee are in considerable danger of losing 
their lives or of being made to suffer inhuman treatment’. ‘Refugee-like’ was explained 
in the travaux préparatoires to refer to a situation where the lack of rule of law or disre-
gard for human rights led to a risk of harm.58 This additional ground was, according to 
the travaux préparatoires, inspired by the fact that articles 3 and 8 of the ECHR have a 
broader applicability than the Convention.59
According to the Government Bill proposing the Act, a new group of persons would 
be created through this addition, who, even though they would not qualify for asylum, 
would be protected from return. However, it was not considered justified to create a 
separate status for them, although they would benefit from ‘asylum’.60 The Committee 
on the Aliens’ Act specifically emphasized that they did not want to call them de facto 
refugees or B-refugees, since it was found to be too narrow a concept.61
At the beginning of the 1990s, humanitarian protection became the ground predom-
inantly utilized in the determination of claims, which resulted in a positive decision.62 
According to Einarsen, the reason was that ‘the Norwegian authorities prefer(ed) the 
increased legal flexibility and favourable public relations which flows from a system 
where Norway seems to protect many more than obliged to under the Immigration Act 
and international treaties’.63 Einarsen however cautioned against the element of discre-
tion as ‘the administrative power to grant protection on humanitarian grounds may 
not always be exercised when someone in need of protection is not recognized as a 
Convention refugee’.64
At the time there was no requirement of individual targeting in order to qualify 
for humanitarian protection, but a direct risk of serious danger had to be established. 
According to the travaux préparatoires, the threshold, both for the type of danger and 
58 Proposisjonen Ot Prp Nr 46 (1986–87) om utlendingsloven 103.
59 T Einarsen, ‘The Legal Condition of Refugees in Norway: National Implementation of Refugee Rights and the 1951 Geneva 
Convention’ (University of Bergen Law Faculty publications, no 45, 1994) 45.
60 Above n 58, 96–97.
61 NOU 1983:47.
62 Einarsen, above n 59, 20.
63 ibid 20.
64 ibid 21.
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the likelihood that it would occur, is higher than for refugee status. The applicant should 
be at immediate risk of being killed or have been subjected to inhuman treatment.65 
In cases of clear discrimination, the requirement of direct threat could be lessened, 
for example, in the case of women who suffered discrimination.66 Another category, 
intended to be captured by this ground, was persons who would have qualified for 
Convention status, but who were not considered eligible according to Norwegian prac-
tice because the actors of persecution were non-state agents.67 Finally, the ground was 
applicable to persons who had fled from a country with armed conflict, or violence 
between groups. It was recognized that persons who had been displaced because of 
such situations often lack individual grounds, but may still have valid protection needs.
In order to harmonize its legislation with the EU acquis, the Norwegian Aliens’ Act 
was replaced by a new piece of legislation, Act of 15 May 2008 on the entry of foreign 
nationals into the kingdom of Norway and their stay in the realm, which entered into 
force in 2010. According to the new section 28(b), persons protected under conven-
tions other than the 1951 Convention would be encompassed by the term refugee: an 
alien will be recognized as a refugee who, ‘without falling within the scope of (a) never-
theless faces a real risk of being subjected to a death penalty, torture or other inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to his or her country of origin’.
3.3.2 Scope of ‘Asylum’ 
Section 28(b) is by and large used in the same manner as article 3 of the ECHR as 
interpreted by the European Court on Human Rights, in particular in regard to the 
interpretation of ‘torture’, ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ and so forth. However, 
it has been envisaged that violations of rights contained in other international instru-
ments, such as articles 2–3 of the ECHR, articles 6–7 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and articles 37a and 38(2)-(4) of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, could also be covered by this provision.68 Einarsen interprets this 
provision to also offer protection from international crimes, such as genocide, crimes 
against humanity, and war crimes.69
The category in section 28(b) is distinguished from the refugee definition is section 
28(a) in that the reason for the feared harm is without consequence. Both provisions 
are now considered to be applicable to non-state actors, which was an important func-
tion of the old humanitarian protection.
3.3.3 Criteria for risk assessment 
There is no requirement for a nexus between the harm and the reason of the feared 
harm, which eases the burden of proof on the applicant.70 The notion of ‘real danger’ 
is not defined in the law. However, according to the travaux préparatoires, it refers to a 
purely objective assessment, which has a higher threshold than ‘well-founded fear’.71 
65 Above n 58, 202.
66 ibid 103.
67 ibid 46.
68 P Tolonen in V Vedstad et al. (ed), Utlendingsloven. Kommentarutgave (Universitetsforlaget 2010) 193, para 36.
69 T Einarsen, Utlendingsloven (Gyldendal Rettsdata 2011), revised 4 Dec 2011, fn 89.
70 Proposisjonen Ot Prp Nr 75 (2006–2007) om utlendingsloven 414.
71 ibid 95.
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The Government Bill continues by stipulating that, ‘If there is a risk of being killed or 
being subjected to torture, it would mean that there will be lesser obligation to make the 
danger probable than when it is a question of less serious effects’.
3.3.4 Caveats 
According to the new status, the flexibility that was inherent in humanitarian protection 
has been removed. The most obvious caveat is that there is now no provision explicitly 
covering persons displaced because of indiscriminate violence. However, according to 
the Government Bill proposing the adoption of the provision, ‘war refugees’ was one 
category that was envisaged to be covered by subsection (b).72 The Committee con-
ducting an inquiry in preparation of the law explicitly stated that:
Both EU’s Qualification Directive and, among others, the Swedish and the 
Finnish Aliens’ Act have a particular reference to situations with armed conflict 
etc. The Committee assumes that such instances will be covered by Article 3 of 
the European Convention on Human Rights i.e. the protection against torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment. The Committee finds that it must be assumed 
that it would always amount to inhuman treatment to return someone to a situa-
tion of armed conflict where the person will be in real danger of being targeted at 
random or individually by acts of war. The Committee does not consider it neces-
sary to draft a particular provision aimed at this type of situation.73
The Government Bill stated further that ‘the Ministry agrees with the Committee that 
persons covered by article 15(c) of the Qualification Directive will be covered by the 
general protection against return to inhuman treatment …. The Ministry has as a point 
of departure that it is unfortunate to separate groups that are protected because of a 
certain reason (war, general violence or disturbances and so forth). It is a key factor of 
the protection, according to article 3 of the European Convention and subsection (b), 
that it does not matter what the reason for the protection need is’.74
According to Christiansen, subsection (b) could be applicable in the case of armed 
conflict in two distinct scenarios; persons who upon return risk being subjected to ran-
dom violence, and persons who risk being subjected to war crimes.75 The distinction 
between these two scenarios is that the first could be seen to equate to a generalized 
risk of violence, which is not covered by the provision. However, the level of intensity 
separates it from sporadic violence, which should be taken into account when applying 
the provision. In the second scenario, the persons risk being subjected to war crimes 
upon return, which, according to Christiansen, is normally a violation to the integrity 
of the individual, for example, torture or inhuman or degrading treatment. In this latter 
case, subsection (b) should be considered as applicable. Christiansen highlights how-
ever that 15(c) refers to the first scenario of ‘indiscriminate violence’.
72 ibid 414.
73 NOU 2004, no 20, 153 (unofficial translation by the author).
74 ibid 95.
75 M Christiansen, in Vedstad et al., above note 68, 194–200, para 37.
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In 2010, the Grand Board of the Norwegian Appeal Board took two precedent-set-
ting decisions assessing the possible application of section 28(b) in regard to return 
to Mogadishu and South Somalia.76 In the first case, the Grand Board found that the 
Qualification Directive is not part of Norwegian law, but even if ‘war refugees’ were to 
be covered by section 28(b) interpreted in the light of article 15(c) of the Directive, 
it would require an exceptional situation. Moreover, there must be a real risk that the 
person will be affected individually. The Grand Board did not find the situation in 
Mogadishu, or Somalia, to be such that it meets the threshold for indiscriminate vio-
lence according to the Directive, or that the random acts that may affect the applicant 
would reach the threshold required by the European Court of Human Rights.
The decision can be compared to the reasoning in a ruling by the first instance court, 
Oslo Tingrett, which, although not precedent-setting, can overturn decisions by the 
Administrative Appeal Board.77 The Court stated that, on the basis of the travaux pré-
paratoires, protection needs generated because of armed conflict or other situations of 
violence can fall within the scope of article 3 and the Norwegian provision 28(b) even 
if it is not explicitly mentioned. With a reference to country of origin information from 
UNHCR, the Tingrett found that the applicant would be in real danger of inhuman 
treatment upon return to Mogadishu and that section 28(b) can be applied to situa-
tions covered by article 15(c) of the Directive, and that article 3 of the ECHR can be 
applied to situations of generalized violence when it reaches an extreme level.
The Grand Board of the Norwegian Appeal Board reviewed the situation again in 
another decision in October 2011. In the second case, the general security situation was 
considered to constitute a real risk triggering subsection (b). The decision has however 
been criticized because it does not define whether there is a state of armed conflict in 
Somalia, nor if war crimes take place that may warrant protection against torture, or 
inhuman or degrading treatment.78
In December 2012, the Grand Board again reviewed the situation in Somalia and 
concluded that there had been significant changes in the security and humanitarian 
situation because of al-Shabaab’s withdrawal that would enable the Board to reconsider 
its decision.79 The Board looked in particular at the reduction in the number of casual-
ties, improved access by humanitarian agencies, and increased freedom of movement. 
The majority found, with reference to AA and others v Sweden, that the high levels of 
crime and lack of effective state protection against the effects of criminalized violence 
did not constitute ‘extreme violence’ that would warrant general protection.80 It should 
however be noted that AA v Sweden and others refers to the intensity of conflict, which 
was not addressed by the Grand Board.81 The minority held however that the fact that 
there was no rule of law, no effective protection from state authorities, and a general 
unpredictability of the situation, would qualify as a real risk for anyone who is present 
in Mogadishu.
76 Grand Board decision regarding case no N103563328, Mar 2010, N1042301014 (Oct 2010).
77 Olso Municipal Court, case no 10-030600TVI-OTIR/05, 3 June 2010.
78 Christiansen, above note 75, 198–200, para. 37.
79 Norwegian Appeal Board, Grand Board decision no N1211741227, Dec 2012.
80 AA and others v Sweden App no 14499/0928 (ECtHR June 2012).
81 ibid para 76.
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3.4 Sweden
3.4.1 ‘Persons otherwise in need of protection’ 
In 1975, the existing practice of granting de facto status in Sweden was codified in the 
Swedish Aliens’ Act, which divided persons in need of international protection into 
refugees, conscientious objectors, and de facto refugees.82 The definition of a ‘de facto 
refugee’ was a person with refugee-like grounds who, without being a refugee, could 
not return to his or her country of origin due to the political conditions in that country. 
In practice, it was found that most cases of ‘conscientious objectors’ and de facto refu-
gees could have fallen under the refugee definition.
Pursuant to the travaux préparatoires, possible categories that could be considered 
as being ‘in a refugee-like situation’ were those who applied for asylum but where the 
standard of proof had not been reached for Convention refugee status.83 Another group 
were persons who had not been exposed to ‘persecution’ in the past but to a lower level 
of harassment, such as repeated arrests and detention, with the purpose of barring them 
from certain professions or educational institutions.84 Persons forced to leave their coun-
try of origin because of armed conflict were in practice accorded politico-humanitarian 
status, instead of protection status.85 There was therefore a perception that persons flee-
ing armed conflict were not genuinely in need of protection, a notion that still persists.
Nobel, who studied the practical application of de facto status in the 1980s, identi-
fied three categories of persons who were granted such status: first, persons who could 
qualify for Convention status but who chose not to apply for fear of losing the option 
of returning to their country of origin for family visits; secondly, so-called ‘border-line 
cases’, that is, persons who did not qualify for refugee status because they did not fully 
meet the criteria, where de facto status was a safety net; and, finally, ‘persons who … fled 
because of the new refugee situations in Asia, Africa, Central America and pre-1989 
Eastern Europe, who are not covered by the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol, but have 
nevertheless been “forced out” of their countries’.86
At the same time, an exception to granting de facto status was introduced, which 
still lives on, if not in law at least in the mind of the practitioners, in cases where there 
may be ‘special reasons’ to deny protection to those in need. The legislator specified in 
the travaux préparatoires that in the case of a mass influx, Sweden may not be able to 
admit large numbers of persons in need of protection and therefore there should be 
a ‘saving clause’ allowing the Government to refuse to grant protection. One example 
of when this ‘saving clause’ was invoked was in the case of Turkish Assyrian refugees 
in 1976–82.87 In 1989, the number of asylum applicants rose by 50 per cent after the 
end of the Cold War and the Government decided to use the ‘saving clause’ again, the 
so-called ‘December decision’, and to only grant protection to Convention refugees.88
82 Regeringens proposition om ändring i utlänningslagen (1954:193) mm, proposition 1975/76:18, 108–09.
83 A Popovic and G Noll, ‘Flyktingstatus – en marginaliserad resurs is svensk asylrätt’ (2005–06) 4 Juridisk Tidskrift 834–65.
84 Proposition 1975/76:18, above n 82, 108–9. cf G Melander, ‘Ett utvidgat flyktingbegepp’ in G Melander (ed), Nordisk flyktin-
grätt (Studentlitteratur 1985) 50.
85 Svensk migrationspolitik i globalt perspektiv, proposition 1996/97:25.
86 P Nobel, ‘What Happened with Sweden’s Refugee Policies?’ (1990) 2 IJRL 268.
87 ibid 271.
88 E Abiri, ‘The Changing Praxis of “Generosity”: Swedish Refugee Policy During the 1990s’ (2000) 13 JRS 15.
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In 1997, the Swedish Aliens’ Act was amended and the concept of ‘persons other-
wise in need of protection’ was introduced in order to harmonize Swedish practice with 
other European countries and UNHCR’s Guidelines. The category ‘persons otherwise 
in need of protection’ was interpreted to include persons with a well-founded fear of 
being sentenced to the death penalty or corporal punishment, or of being subjected 
to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and, for the first 
time, to aliens in need of protection because of external or internal armed conflict or 
who cannot return to the country of origin because of an environmental disaster. It 
also included aliens who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of gender or 
sexual orientation.89
The concept of ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’ was further expanded, in 
2004, through legislative changes to include, apart from de facto refugees and ‘consci-
entious objectors’, those who were previously granted status on politico-humanitarian 
grounds, while gender-related persecution was moved into the provision on refugee 
grounds. In 2010, the Aliens’ Act was amended to transpose article 15(b) and (c) of 
the Qualification Directive verbatim, while the additional protection ground ‘persons 
otherwise in need of international protection’ was retained, but moved to another 
provision.90
3.4.2 Scope of ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’ 
The Swedish Aliens’ Act (2005:716) now divides persons forcibly displaced because 
of armed conflict into three distinct categories; (i) those leaving because of an armed 
conflict (chapter 4, section 2, first sentence, subsidiary protection), (ii) because of an 
external or internal armed conflict (section 2a, first sentence), (iii) because of ‘other 
severe conflicts’ in the country of origin (section 2a, second sentence). Both the latter 
are accorded status as ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’.
Two distinctions need to be made, first, between the scope of application of the two 
forms of internal armed conflict, subsidiary protection and person ‘otherwise in need 
of protection’. According to the travaux préparatoires, the scope of application of the 
subsidiary protection provision is more restrictive, since it only applies to civilians and 
requires a serious and individual threat to life or person, while the provision on persons 
‘otherwise in need of protection’ is applicable to everyone, without any requirement of 
an individualized risk assessment.91
The second distinction is between the two provisions on persons ‘otherwise in need 
of protection’ because of generalized violence. The main difference between ‘inter-
nal conflict’ and ‘severe conflict’ lies in the interpretation of the level of intensity. The 
travaux préparatoires of the Swedish Aliens’ Act interpret ‘severe conflict’ to include 
situations of political instability in the country of origin where the power structures are 
such that the legal system does not impartially protect civilians’ fundamental human 
rights. In regard to the parties to the conflict, it may be a conflict between different 
89 ibid.
90 In May 2009, the Commission’s case against Sweden for non-communication of measures fully transposing the Qualification 
Directive resulted in a ruling by the European Court of Justice that Sweden had breached art 226 EC Treaty 559. The case 
was closed in Jan 2010 after Sweden had communicated legislative measures, which it claimed fully transposed the Directive.
91 Proposition 2009/10:31, 118.
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groups in the population; between a group from the population in one part of the coun-
try and the government; or, between the government or a civilian group in the coun-
try and another government, where the conflict does not reach the level of an internal 
armed conflict.92
However, in order to invoke the provision of ‘other severe conflict’, the applicant 
must show a well-founded fear of serious abuse, and that there is a nexus between the 
severe conflict and the possible abuse.93 The definition of what constitutes ‘serious 
abuse’ is interpreted to be broader than how the Qualification Directive defines ‘serious 
threat’ in regard to the type of human rights violation (for instance, including harass-
ment) and the level of seriousness of the violation. In a Guiding Decision, the Swedish 
Migration Board has interpreted the individualization of fear that has to be established 
as when the applicant is ‘personally at risk’ with some ‘particular circumstance’ that 
demonstrates this.94 A UNHCR 2007 study on the implementation of the Qualification 
Directive in selected EU member states found that the consequence of this interpreta-
tion was an expectation that the applicant should be at greater risk than others in a 
similar situation, which would be contrary to the European Court of Human Rights 
case-law in, for example, Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands.95
The Swedish Aliens’ Act has one additional category that may qualify for comple-
mentary protection, ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’ (chapter 4, section 2a, 
second sentence), that is, persons fleeing an environmental disaster. The travaux pré-
paratoires prescribe that this provision can be applied in the case of a sudden disaster, 
and when it would be contrary to the spirit of humanity to return someone to the coun-
try where such a disaster has taken place.96 This provision has not been applied in prac-
tice to date. The Commission of Inquiry assessing the transposition of the Qualification 
Directive into Swedish law proposed that this provision be moved to another chapter 
of the Aliens’ Act as it does not pertain to protection in the sense of the Directive.97 
The provision was retained however as a category of ‘persons otherwise in need of 
protection’.
3.4.3 Criteria for risk assessment 
In 2007, the Migration Court of Appeal took a precedent-setting decision on a claim 
by an applicant from Iraq, which determined the threshold for what should constitute 
an internal armed conflict according to the current section 2a (first sentence) of the 
Swedish Aliens’ Act. The criteria for an internal armed conflict according to the Court 
should be that there are clashes between a state’s armed forces and other organized 
groups, that the level of violence rise above the level of sporadic and isolated acts of vio-
lence and, finally, the armed group should exercise territorial control enabling them to 
92 Proposition 1996/97:25, above n 85, 99; Ny instans- och processordning i utlännings- och medborgarskapsärenden proposition 
2004/05:170, 274.
93 Reconfirmed in the position, Swedish Migration Board, Rättsligt ställningstagande angående skydd vid ‘andra svåra motsättnin-
gar i hemlandet, RC 01/2014, 9 Jan 2014.
94 Guiding Decision on Iraq, Swedish Migration Board, 5 July 2007.
95 UNHCR, ‘Asylum in the European Union: A  Study of the Implementation of the Qualification Directive’ (November 
2007) 74; Salah Sheekh v The Netherlands App no 1948/04 (ECtHR, 11 Jan 2007).
96 Proposition 1996/97:25, above n 85, 100–01.
97 SOU 2006:6, 166–69.
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carry out military operations. The Court found that the situation in Iraq did not consti-
tute an internal armed conflict in the sense of the Swedish Aliens’ Act, based on a very 
narrow interpretation of the concept of ‘armed conflict’.98 Instead, Iraqi applicants would 
be assessed under the provision on ‘severe conflict’, which entailed both an assessment 
of personalized risk and an assessment of the nexus between the expected harm and the 
severe conflict, which therefore put the threshold for qualification quite high.
The Migration Court of Appeal had in fact adopted a domestic interpretation of 
what constitutes internal armed conflict, instead of being guided by international 
humanitarian law.99 In 2009, the Migration Court of Appeal reviewed the matter of the 
threshold for armed conflict in three cases on Somalia and adopted a broader and more 
inclusive interpretation, inter alia by also taking into account common article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions, and by attempting to harmonize its interpretation with interna-
tional standards and the case law of other European countries.100 In these precedent-
setting cases, the Court found that the situation in Mogadishu did indeed constitute an 
internal armed conflict, which meant that the provision is now applicable to a greater 
number of asylum applications.
The 2011 study of the Migration Courts’ practice showed that that the Courts use 
the definition from the Somalia rulings of ‘internal armed conflict’ with reference to 
the impact on civilian population and generalized violence also when assessing ‘inter-
nal armed conflict’ in accordance with the provision on subsidiary protection.101 As 
mentioned previously, according to the Elgafaji judgment, there should be a ‘sliding 
scale’ when assessing the need for personal risk when applying subsidiary protection.102 
However, the Migration Courts assess the personal risk as a rule in all cases of subsidi-
ary protection, regardless of the intensity of violence. It should also be noted that, the 
evaluation of the intensity of the conflict is linked to the assessment of whether there is 
armed conflict and not to the assessment of the real risk of harm to civilians.103
In regard to risk assessment of ‘persons otherwise in need of protection’ because 
of a severe conflict, the travaux préparatoires stipulated that the threshold for ‘severe 
abuse’ in a situation of ‘severe conflict’ should be lower than that of ‘persecution’ in the 
refugee definition. The requirements in practice of what constitutes this type of act and 
the intensity of the act is higher than what is recommended by the travaux préparatoires. 
However, a project by UNHCR assessing the quality of first instance decision-making, 
conducted in 2011, also showed that in 39 per cent of the cases where there was a situ-
ation of severe conflict, the application was rejected because of a lack of nexus between 
98 Ruling by the Migration Court of Appeal, MIG 2007:9, 26 Feb 2007.
99 R Stern, ‘Folkrättens roll i vägledande migrationsrättslig praxis’ (2010) 4 Svensk Jurist Tidning 358–76; J Magnusson, ‘A 
Question of Definition – The Concept of Internal Armed Conflict in the Swedish Aliens’ Act’ (2008) 10 EJML 381–409. 
There has been discussion in recent years about whether international humanitarian law should be the guiding light for 
migration authorities when assessing whether a situation qualifies as armed conflict. cf, H Storey, ‘Armed Conflict in Asylum 
Law: The ‘War-Flaw’ (2012) 31 RSQ 1–32; J-F Durieux, ‘Of War, Flows, Laws and Flaws: A Reply to Hugo Storey’ (2012) 
31 RSQ 161–76.
100 Ruling by the Migration Court of Appeal, MIG 2009:27, 6 Oct 2009.
101 A Segenstedt and R Stern, Vad krävs för att få skydd? (Swedish Red Cross Stockholm 2011), 34–35.
102 Elgafaji, above n 53, 39.
103 UNHCR, Safe at Last?, above n 51, 32. It is at this stage not clear how the judgment by the CJEU in Diakité v Commissaire 
général aux réfugiés et apatrides, case C-285/12, (2014) WLR (D) 37, will affect the interpretation of internal armed conflict 
and thereby the distinction between the two articles.
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the severe abuse and the severe conflict.104 This was notwithstanding the fact that in 
96 per cent of the cases the applicant claimed past abuse, which could qualify, accord-
ing to the definition in the Aliens’ Act, as ‘severe abuse’. Moreover, UNHCR found it 
problematic that there is no individual determination of the cases, which the Aliens’ 
Act prescribes, but a comparison is made to what happens to others and a check that 
it is part of the general security situation in that part of the country. The result is that 
the application of persons ‘otherwise in need of protection’ in practice becomes quite 
restrictive.
3.4.4 Caveats 
The fact that there are currently three different provisions in the Swedish Aliens’ Act 
whose scope of application and demarcations are somewhat overlapping creates gaps in 
the factual application, instead of filling them.105 According to the travaux préparatoires 
of the Swedish Aliens’ Act, the purpose of the introduction of the ground on ‘severe 
conflict’ was to ensure that these claims were dealt with as claims for protection rather 
than on humanitarian grounds, as had previously been the practice. It was particu-
larly emphasized that this provision should be applied in cases of human rights abuses 
against women and to encompass severely traumatized individuals who otherwise may 
not fulfil the requirement for well-founded fear.106 Furthermore, the travaux prépara-
toires explicitly state that the purpose of the introduction of these two concepts was 
not to restrict the possibility for applicants to receive residency permits. However, the 
criteria that are stipulated for protection on the basis of severe conflict set the thresh-
old high, in that there is a need to show individualized persecution, as well as a nexus 
between the human rights violations and the conflict.
In regard to the other provision on persons ‘otherwise in need of protection’ because 
of internal and external armed conflict, at the time of the Mogadishu rulings, this was 
the only provision in Swedish law on internal armed conflict and, even though it was 
broader than 15(c), it was also considered to be applicable to cases falling under this 
provision. As pointed out by Stern, the ruling was basically a mixture of common arti-
cle 3 and Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and article 2 and 
15(c) of the Qualification Directive.107 In 2010, the Qualification Directive was how-
ever formally transposed, adding the ‘official’ ground of internal armed conflict. A 2011 
study comparing the application of the two concepts of internal armed conflict in the 
practice of the second instance Migration Courts found in fact that the broader provi-
sion on armed conflict was not utilized in practice during the four-month period that 
the project lasted.108 It can therefore be questioned whether it is necessary to have an 
the additional ground on international armed conflict after the Elgafaji judgment con-
firmed that there is no requirement of individualized risk for subsidiary protection.109
104 L Feijen and E Frennmark, Kvalitet i svensk asylprövning. En studie av Migrationsverkets utredning av och beslut om internationellt 
skydd (UNHCR Stockholm 2011) 173–80.
105 UNHCR, Safe at Last?, above n 51, 92–94.
106 Proposition 2004/05:170, above n 92, 174–78.
107 Stern, above n 99, 373.
108 Segenstedt and Stern, above n 101.
109 See however the comments by the Swedish Migration Board and the courts in, UNHCR, Safe at Last?, above n 51, 51–52.
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The situation in Syria showed however another dimension of the applicability of 
the different articles constituting parts of a comprehensive toolkit adaptable to the 
nuances of an evolving situation. At the end of 2011, the Swedish Migration Board 
categorized the situation as ‘other severe conflict’, in January 2012, directives for inhi-
bition of return were issued that were also applicable to those who did not fulfil the 
individual criteria for protection, in June 2012, the situation was reclassified as ‘internal 
armed conflict’, which enabled the applicants to receive a three-year residence permit, 
while in September 2012, it was reconfirmed that it was an internal armed conflict, but 
that permanent residence permits should be issued as there was no end of the conflict 
in sight.110
4 .  C o n C L u S I o n
What conclusions can be drawn when comparing the use of complementary forms of 
protection in the Nordic countries? The first must be that, although the intention stated 
in the travaux préparatoires for the status was to expand the scope of beneficiaries of 
international protection, the fact is that complementary protection is often used where 
refugee or subsidiary protection could have been used. The second conclusion is that 
the threshold for its application is higher, or its application is for a more limited group 
of beneficiaries, than was originally intended. It can therefore be questioned whether 
these complementary forms of protection adhere to the criteria of the Treaty establish-
ing the European Community of being more favourable and ensuring the coherence of 
Community action.
Are there then any benefits of retaining complementary forms of protection outside 
the scope of EU harmonization? On paper, of course, it sounds good to have additional 
protection grounds. It is a fact that the EU acquis only provides the minimum in terms 
of protection. Prior to the harmonization of subsidiary protection, there were a number 
of other categories that benefitted from different forms of complementary protection 
where states felt obliged to provide protection from refoulement, most notably persons 
fleeing generalized violence because of human rights abuses, and persons displaced 
because of environmental or humanitarian disasters. These categories remain outside 
the scope of EU harmonization. Moreover, the Common European Asylum System is 
still a system in statu nascendi, where the interpretation of the directives is in progress, 
but is far from complete. Until the European Court of Justice interprets all aspects of the 
article 15, there is likely to remain divergences between the member states in how they 
choose to interpret it, which complementary protection ad interim ensures is covered.
However, there are also inherent traps in having protection statuses that fall out-
side those that European countries feel themselves legally bound by. Despite very clear 
travaux préparatoires and guidance from the legislator that the intention with comple-
mentary forms of protection is to capture those who fall between other statuses and 
to grant status to everyone who deserves it, in practice it is quite restrictively used. 
The reason for this may be that complementary forms of protection do not seem to be 
designed to identify persons in need of protection, but are rather an act of generosity 
towards those who ‘almost’ qualified. In several of the Nordic countries, the origin of 
complementary protection was to grant status to those who could not show sufficient 
110 Swedish Migration Board, RCI 32/2011, RCI 1/2012, RCI 14/2012, RCI 14/2013.
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evidence or had lacked credibility and therefore did not receive refugee status. This may 
still be a factor, which taints the perception of those who are assessed for complemen-
tary forms of protection.
Furthermore, even though the Nordic countries have a ‘single procedure’ assessing 
all protection (and humanitarian) claims, which should take into account all available 
evidence, the assessment on complementary protection is often seen as an assessment 
of ‘returnability’ and not of ‘eligibility’, that is, the emphasis of the assessment is on 
whether there are obstacles to return rather than if the criteria are fulfilled to obtain 
a status. There is also an element of discretion and a lack of clarity in how and when 
these statuses are used, without clear case law and guidelines on their application, a fact 
which can be called into question from the perspective of rule of law.
Finally, in some of the countries, there was the possibility in the past of suspending 
de facto status when numbers exceeded the reception and absorption capacity of the 
country. Although this is no longer the case according to the legislation, there is still 
an underlying misconception that complementary protection can be suspended when 
the numbers of applicants are too high. This idea is contrary to international refugee 
law, which clearly provides that persons in need of protection should be identified and 
be granted such status as they may qualify for, regardless of the numbers of applicants.
In sum, complementary protection can be a useful mechanism to ensure protec-
tion for groups with protection needs outside the existing international and regional 
conventions that are applicable. However, it is essential that the 1951 Convention, and 
articles 3 of the CAT and the ECHR are used to their full potential first, to ensure pro-
tection to persons who qualify for protection under these instruments, and through the 
application of the subsidiary protection in the Qualification Directive.
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